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Introduction

The Commerce Clause has long been a constitutional powerhouse underlying federal
legislation. 1 The recent decision in United States v. Lopez 2 marks the first
time in almost sixty years that the Supreme Court has held that Congress had
exceeded its power to regulate interstate commerce. 3 In Lopez, the Court held
that Congress overreached its power in enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990, 4 which prohibited posses- [*2] sion of firearms within one thousand
feet of a school. Lopez thus breaks a long line of cases deferring to
congressional action. Historically, the Court has sustained federal regulation
of civil rights, 5 loan-sharking, 6 restoration of environmental damage, 7 labor
relations, 8 and home-grown wheat, 9 even where such activities had tenuous
links to interstate commerce. The Lopez Court, although recognizing the great
breadth accorded Congress under such decisions, attempted to create special
protection for state sovereignty. 10 This article will argue that Lopez does so
by implicitly combining two previously separate limitations on the commerce
power into a heightened scrutiny of federal legislation regulating areas of
traditional concern to the states.
As the first case since the New Deal nullifying congressional action as beyond
the reach of the Commerce Clause, Lopez inevitably will play an important role
in the Court's continuing definition of federalism, the distribution of powers
between the federal and state governments. 11 The Court has historically
[*3] struggled to define the limits on congressional power vis-a-vis the
states. 12 Shifting majorities of the Court have disagreed on whether the Tenth
Amendment imposes substantive or procedural limits on the commerce power. 13 The

rhetoric of Lopez clearly envisions substantive limits on the federal
government's power to legislate on local matters. 14 Lopez purports to preserve
certain domains of activity for state regulation. The Gun-Free School Zones Act
was held to be an incursion on the states' po- [*4] lice power 15 and ability
to conduct education. 16 Allowing the statute to stand would have imperiled the
"distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local." 17 This
article will conclude that such a dichotomy is likely to prove illusory, that
the doctrinal limits of Lopez will in practice be more modest than its rhetoric
suggests. The decision, however, may play an important role in a rather
different conception of federal-state relations. Part I sets out the doctrinal
development of the two limits on the commerce power that come together in the
Lopez analysis. The first limit is the scope of the Commerce Clause itself.
Modern case law has interpreted the provision very broadly, upholding
wide-ranging congressional regulation of activity with indirect links to
interstate commerce. The other limit is the extrinsic limit imposed by the Tenth
Amendment. Recent case law has developed several Tenth Amendment doctrines that
restrict the ability of Congress to regulate the operations of state
governments. Part II argues that under Lopez, the Tenth Amendment limits on
regulation of state governments have been extended to cover regulation of
private activity within areas of traditional concern to the states. Part III
analyzes the likely effect of Lopez as a limit on federal legislative power.
Lopez seeks to bar federal regulation of the "truly local" aspects of such areas
as education and crime. But Congress will remain able to legislate widely in
such areas because of inevitable jurisdictional links to commercial and economic
activity. However, Congress will be able to do so only by addressing heightened
requirements in the legislative process. Thus, although Lopez seeks to create
substantive limits protecting areas of state concern, its effect is likely to be
more consistent with the procedural conception of federalism.

I. Internal and External Limits on the Commerce Power

Lopez implicitly brings together two related sets of cases interpreting the
limits of Congress' commerce power. Section A of this Part discusses the cases
addressing the Commerce Clause
[*5] itself, which grants Congress the power "to regulate Commerce . . . among
the several States." 18 During the first third of this century, the Court
nullified a number of federal statutes with a narrow interpretation of the
Clause. Since then, however, the Court has construed the power much more
broadly, consistently finding a sufficient link to commerce to uphold
legislation directed at more general social problems. Section B discusses the
case law under the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to the states all powers not
granted to Congress. 19 The Tenth Amendment had been read simply as a grant of
residuary power, granting the states whatever powers remained after determining
what fell within the federal powers. But the Court has recently interpreted the

Tenth Amendment as supplying affirmative limitations on the powers of the
federal government to regulate state governments. As the next Part will discuss,
Lopez implicitly extends this approach by bringing Tenth Amendment concerns into
the analysis when the federal government regulates individuals.

A. The Scope of the Commerce Power

Understanding the impact of Lopez on federal legislative power requires
reexamining the cases applying the Commerce Clause, because Lopez turns on
distinctions not discovered in previous cases. An early case still sets the
terms for debate. 20 The phrase giving Congress the power "to regulate Commerce
. . . among the several States" 21 provides several hooks for a narrow
construction. The power to "regulate" could be limited to something like setting
shipping terms. "Commerce" could be understood to cover only commodities
transactions between merchants. The qualifier "among the several States" could
limit the regulatory power of Congress to interstate shipments or even to actual
crossing of state boundaries. 22 Gibbons v. Ogden, 23 however, yielded a broad
interpretation on all counts. In ruling that the power to regulate commerce
included the power to regulate shipping in the waters of New York State, Chief
Justice John Marshall established several points. The
[*6] power to "regulate" was broad: "to prescribe the rule by which commerce
is to be governed." 24 "This power, like all others vested in Congress, is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." 25 The Court also
read "commerce" broadly, rejecting a definition limited to buying and selling
commodities:

This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its
significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it
is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and
parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for
carrying on that intercourse. 26

Nor was the power limited to interstate activity: "Commerce among the States,
cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced
into the interior." 27
But the decision also recognized limits: the power would not extend to commerce

that was "completely internal" to a state and that did not "extend to or affect
other States." 28 Such vague limits are not easily applied. The key cases from
that day to the present have turned on how those limits should be defined.
Until the turn of the century, the Court had few occasions to address how far
the commerce power extended. 29 Then, as Congress became more active in
regulation, the Court decided a number of cases which are hard to reconcile.
Some cases upheld congressional action in the expansive spirit of Gibbons. So
understood, Congress' power to regulate commerce went well beyond regulating the
manner in which commerce was conducted. The Court sustained a number of statutes
that used a link to interstate commerce as a method of controlling activity
within the states. Thus, the Court upheld statutes prohibiting the interstate
transportation of stolen cars, 30 of lottery tickets, 31 of prosti- [*7]
tutes, 32 and of impure food. 33 The Court also construed the power to regulate
interstate commerce to extend to intrastate activity that affected interstate
commerce. Thus, the Shreveport Rate Cases 34 upheld legislation authorizing
rates for intrastate rail shipments because such control was "essential or
appropriate" to regulation of interstate commerce. 35 Swift & Co. v. United
States 36 sustained the application of the federal anti-trust laws to a
conspiracy among meat packers on the grounds that the conspiracy affected the
amount of shipments made, the market prices of meat, and the shipping fees paid
railroads. 37 Swift relied on a practical, rather than technical conception of
interstate commerce, i.e., whether an activity in actuality affects commerce,
rather than a technical distinction between commerce and noncommerce. 38
Other cases during the same period, however, sought to limit Congress with
confined readings of the Commerce Clause. In contrast to the sweeping language
of Gibbons, these cases hemmed in the commerce power with formalistic
distinctions. United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 39 held that the federal
antitrust laws could not reach a conspiracy among sugar manufacturers because
manufacturing was not commerce, on the theory that the manufacture of a good
precedes its shipment and thus its entry into commerce. 40 Similarly, Carter v.
Carter Coal Co. 41 held that the commerce power did not authorize the regulation
of bituminous coal production, on the basis that mining precedes
[*8] commerce. 42 The Court also struck down regulation of activity that
succeeded to commerce. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States 43
invalidated rules setting maximum hours and minimum wages for slaughterhouse
workers, who dealt with livestock after it had been transported from state to
state. 44 Schechter relied on another formalism when it held that the effect of
the regulated activity on meat prices was only an "indirect" effect on
interstate commerce and therefore not within the purview of Congress' commerce
power. 45 Similarly, Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co. 46 ruled
that requiring railroads to establish pension plans was not an authorized
exercise of the commerce power because the social welfare of the worker was too
remote from commerce. 47

In other cases where interstate commerce was plainly part of the activity at
issue, the Court held that the statute regulated not commerce but a
non-commercial aspect of the activity. Thus, Adair v. United States 48
invalidated a statute that barred railroads from discharging workers for being
members of a union, on the basis that the statute regulated union membership,
not interstate commerce. 49 The Court made another elusive distinction in
invalidating a statute making common carriers liable if their negligence injured
their employees, stating that the statute impermissibly regulated the employees
involved in commerce, rather than regulating the business of interstate
commerce. 50 In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League, 51
Justice Holmes held professional baseball not to be interstate commerce and thus
not subject to the federal antitrust laws. 52 The necessary travel and
transportation of equipment across state lines were not commerce because they
were merely incident to the games, which in turn were not commerce because the
personal effort was not related to production. 53
Even where the statute governed interstate commerce, the
[*9] Court might deem it to go beyond regulation. Hammer v. Dagenhart 54
limited the range of permissible "regulation." Congress had banned transport in
interstate commerce of goods made in factories that violated child labor
standards. 55 The Court held that the power to regulate commerce did not permit
Congress to exclude goods from commerce. 56 The Court distinguished the cases
involving interstate transportation of impure food and lottery tickets on the
basis that those involved the exclusion from commerce of goods having harmful
qualities, whereas products of child labor were not inherently harmful. 57
Rather than excluding harmful goods from interstate commerce, the statute
impermissibly regulated a local evil that had not extended into interstate
commerce. 58
At the same time as the Court regularly used the Commerce Clause and other
constitutional doctrines to nullify federal statutes, the New Deal greatly
widened the scope of federal legislation. 59 Perhaps due to the political
pressure to let social legislation stand 60 (most notably, President Franklin
Roosevelt's storied attempt to increase the size of the Court to permit
appointment of more congenial Justices), the Court's application of the Commerce
Clause took a sharply different tack with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
61 in which steel manufacturers
[*10] challenged the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. 62 The statute
granted employees the right to form unions, imposed duties to engage in
collective bargaining, and created the National Labor Relations Board, with
power to act against "unfair labor practices . . . affecting commerce." 63 A
narrow majority of the Court declined to apply the manufacturing/commerce
distinction of E.C. Knight and Carter Coal or to rule that the effect on
commerce was merely indirect. Rather, the Court held regulation of labor
relations to be within Congress' broad powers to protect interstate commerce
from burdens and obstructions, regardless of the source. 64

In the following decades, an unbroken series of cases continued to uphold a
broad conception of the commerce power. The Court repudiated the limiting
distinctions of its restrictive holdings and, over time, adopted three
alternative bases for justifying legislation. The commerce power covered three
broad categories: regulating the use of channels of interstate commerce; 65
protecting goods or people in commerce and the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce; 66 and regulating activities affecting commerce. 67 In applying each
category, the Court explicitly rejected the restrictive distinctions of earlier
cases. Accordingly, the power to regulate the use of the channels of commerce
was not limited to regulation directed at commerce itself. United States v.
Darby 68 upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act, which prohibited interstate
shipment of goods if minimum wage and maximum hour standards were violated
respecting anyone employed in their production. 69 Darby held that Congress had
the power to exclude any article from interstate commerce, explicitly overruling
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 70 which had struck down the ban on interstate shipment of
the products of child labor. 71 An even
[*11] broader alternative holding in Darby was that Congress could regulate
intrastate labor conditions in order to prevent the spread of substandard wages.
72 If intrastate producers were not subject to regulation, they could reduce
costs by paying less than a minimum wage and thereby gain a competitive
advantage against other goods sold in interstate commerce. 73 Under such a view,
Congress could regulate intrastate activities to prevent them from spreading a
perceived problem through interstate commerce.
The second category, the power to protect the instrumentalities of commerce and
persons in commerce, also supported legislation directed at social ills much
broader than commerce. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited racial
discrimination by hotels and restaurants whose operations affected commerce,
broadly defined. 74 In upholding the statute, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States 75 noted testimony before congressional committees that racial
discrimination made it more difficult and sometimes impossible for some
travellers to find accommodations. 76 Notably, the Court held that it made no
difference whether the travel was commercial or was by private automobile. 77
The Court also upheld application of the statute even to motels of a purely
local character. 78 If the motel served travellers, then it could be regulated
in order to protect interstate commerce from racial discrimination. 79 Likewise,
Katzenbach v. McClung 80 upheld application of the statute to any restaurant if
it served interstate travellers or if a substantial portion of the food it
served had moved in commerce. 81 Accordingly, the commerce power authorized
regulation of a local restaurant with no interstate travellers as customers,
where it purchased 46% of its food from a supplier who had procured it from out
of state. 82 Thus the power to protect the movement of products in commerce was
also drawn very broadly.
The last category, activities affecting commerce, provided an even wider scope

for congressional regulation, as the Court con- [*12] sistently found
sufficient links to commerce to uphold legislation. Purely intrastate activity
was subject to regulation if it had effects on interstate commerce. 83 The
effects were sufficient if they went to the terms on which commerce was
conducted, such as the price of goods. 84 United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.
85 upheld the application of price regulations to milk even when produced and
sold intrastate, holding that Congress could regulate intrastate transactions in
order to effectively regulate interstate prices. 86 Wickard v. Filburn 87 upheld
congressional authority to regulate production of goods that never reached
interstate commerce, or even intrastate commerce. 88 Wickard sustained the
application of production quotas to a small farmer's wheat that was not sold but
rather used for home consumption, fed to his livestock or kept for the next
year's sowing. 89 The Court held distinctions between production and commerce or
between direct and indirect effects on commerce to be irrelevant. 90 Home-grown
wheat affected the overall demand for wheat and therefore affected the market
price of wheat. 91 A farmer that used home-grown wheat would not need to
purchase such wheat on the market. 92 In order to control the market price of
wheat, Congress could regulate production of wheat that never left the farm, let
alone moved in interstate commerce. 93
In addition, the Court accorded great deference to Congress in deciding whether
an activity affected commerce, requiring only that Congress have "a rational
basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of
commerce." 94 Accordingly, the Court sustained statutes with attenuated links to
interstate commerce. Maryland v. Wirtz 95 upheld the expansion of the federal
minimum wage and maximum hour statute to cover not just employees engaged in
commerce or in production of goods for commerce, but also all employees of an
enterprise that
[*13] had any employees engaged in interstate commerce. 96 An employer could
reduce overall costs by paying substandard wages to employees who were not
involved in production for interstate commerce, which would affect the prices at
which the employer sold products in interstate commerce. 97 In order to compete,
companies in other states might have to pay their employees substandard wages.
98 Perez v. United States 99 sustained a federal conviction for loansharking,
where the defendant had made a loan to a butcher and used threats of violence to
extract usurious interest. 100 Even if the particular transaction did not affect
interstate commerce, it was sufficient that such activity in general affected
commerce by funding organized crime and permitting it to take over legitimate
businesses. 101 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. 102
sustained federal regulation of various environmental aspects of surface mining,
including restoration of land and vegetation, preservation of topsoil, and
disposition of waste. 103 The Court looked to both the adverse economic effects
from environmental damage and to the possibility that interstate competition
between mining companies created incentives to reduce costs by not remedying
environmental damage. 104

Such decisions left no doubt that the commerce power was extremely broad. 105
But, on the basis of the case law, it was very difficult to state where the
outer limits lay. There were a number of cases providing examples of legislation
that fell within the power, but now there existed not a single example of a
statute that definitively exceeded the power. None of the earlier cases
invalidating statutes provided a reliable benchmark for when congressional
action would exceed the commerce power, for each case either had been explicitly
overruled or was very questionable authority in light of later case law. So at
the time that Lopez came before the Court, it was unclear how close a connection
to interstate commerce was required to sustain legislation.
[*14] Section B will argue that, in redefining the analysis of that issue,
Lopez was strongly influenced by a different type of limit on the commerce
power, the Tenth Amendment cases.

B. Tenth Amendment Limitations on the Commerce Power

The second set of cases that converge in Lopez address limits on the commerce
power stemming from the Tenth Amendment's reservation of power to the states.
Such cases limit congressional power not because the regulated activity does not
affect interstate commerce, but rather because Congress' action infringes on
state sovereignty. In recent times, the Court has applied three related
doctrines to protect the operations of the states from regulation under the
commerce power. Under the holding of National League of Cities v. Usery 106
(which has been overruled but retains vigorous support by some Justices on the
Court), federal regulation could not infringe the states' freedom to structure
integral governmental operations. 107 Under New York v. United States, 108
Congress may not require state legislatures and administrations to participate
in federal regulatory schemes. 109 Under the clear statement rule of Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 110 the Court will avoid applying federal regulatory statutes to state
governments unless the statute unmistakably applies. 111 Although these
doctrines apply only to federal statutes regulating state governments, Part II
will discuss how they strongly influence the Lopez analysis of congressional
power to regulate the activity of individuals.
The first of the three doctrines has a tangled history. The Court has
consistently recognized that the Constitution protects state sovereignty from
federal incursions. But the Court's definition of the nature of such protection
has changed dramatically. Wirtz sustained application of minimum wage and
maximum hour regulations of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state-run schools
and hospitals. 112 The Court rejected the argument that such control infringed
state sovereignty protected by the Tenth
[*15] Amendment. 113 If general regulations were within the commerce power,
the Court held that it made no difference if a state was among the regulated
entities. 114 The federal statute would apply even to what might be considered

core governmental functions, as well as proprietary activities in which the
state resembled other employers. 115 Fry v. United States 116 followed Wirtz in
upholding the application to state employees of federal limits on salary
increases under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. 117 But the Court no
longer dismissed the proposition that state governments might be less subject to
federal regulation than other entities. 118 The Court stated that the Tenth
Amendment would prevent congressional action that damaged the capacity of a
state government to operate. 119 Controls on wages, however, were not
sufficiently invasive to invalidate the regulation. 120 Justice Rehnquist
dissented, voicing concerns that would reappear in a different rubric in Lopez.
In his view, the controls violated affirmative limits on the ability of Congress
to regulate traditional governmental activities of the states, such as operating
schools and hospitals. 121
A narrow majority of the Court adopted Justice Rehnquist's view in National
League of Cities v. Usery. 122 Overruling Wirtz, 123 the Court struck down the
application of federal minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to state
employees. 124 The opinion drew an analogy between individual rights and the
rights of states. 125 Just as a federal statute within the commerce power would
be invalid if it violated an individual's right
[*16] to a fair trial or to due process, a federal statute regulating commerce
could not "displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions." 126 Regulation of state employees
was held to be such an infringement. 127 The power to set the wages and hours of
state employees in governmental functions was essential to the states' "separate
and independent existence" and therefore beyond the power of Congress. 128
But after several decisions struggling with the application of its doctrine, 129
National League of Cities was overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority 130 Like National League of Cities, Garcia was a five to four
decision, a change of position by Justice Blackmun tipping the scales. Garcia
recognized that application of the vague protections afforded to the states had
been difficult. 131 The rule of National League of Cities, which protected
"traditional" and "integral" state governmental functions, had proved "unsound
in principle and unworkable in practice." 132 Lower court decisions exhibited
considerable confusion. Courts had held that licensing automobile drivers and
operating an airport were integral governmental functions, but regulating road
traffic and regulating air transportation were
[*17] not, drawing apparently arbitrary distinctions. 133 In addition,
providing special protection for "traditional" and "integral" functions actually
undercut an important rationale for federalism. One purpose of vesting states
with governmental powers is to permit them to experiment with various approaches
in whatever areas the state and its people choose. 134 There is no reason to
give less protection to a state activity simply because it is of recent origin.
135

But the main reason for the change in doctrine was that Garcia stands for a
different conception of federalism than National League of Cities. Rather than
relying on substantive limits on congressional power devised by the courts,
Garcia relied primarily on the political processes inherent in the structure of
federal and state government. 136 Garcia recognized that the federal structure
of the Constitution required protection of state sovereignty. 137 But sufficient
protection was to be found not in substantive limits but rather in the
procedural safeguards in the constitutional structure, such as the limited
powers granted to Congress, the representation of the states in Congress and
their role in selecting the members of the federal government. 138 These
provided more effective means for the states to control the federal government
than judicial attempts to strike a balance. 139 The Court left open the
possibility that a failure in those procedural safeguards could warrant judicial
invalidation of a congressional action. 140 Conceivably, a state could have been
denied participation in the political process or somehow made isolated or
powerless. 141 But absent such a showing, federal ac- [*18] tion under the
Commerce Clause would not be invalidated simply because of its substantive
effect on a state. Thus Garcia appeared to consign the implementation of
federalism to the political process rather than judicial review. 142 Forceful
dissents by Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist, however, predicted that future
decisions would in turn overrule Garcia, reinstating the doctrine of National
League of Cities. 143 Subsequent Supreme Court opinions have echoed those
sentiments. 144
The Court indeed recently adopted a second Tenth Amendment doctrine 145 that,
although narrower in scope, represents a return to application of substantive
limits on Congress, rather than reliance on political processes. New York v.
United States nullified parts of a federal scheme for regulating waste disposal
on the basis that the statute "commandeered" state legislatures by requiring
them to enact statutes according to congressional direction. 146 The Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 147 made states responsible for
regulating disposal of low-level radioactive waste. 148 The Act set deadlines
for each state to ratify legislation either joining a regional compact with
[*19] other states or developing disposal facilities within the state. 149 A
state that failed to meet deadlines would: (i) not receive a share of certain
fees collected at disposal sites; (ii) not be permitted access to certain
disposal sites; and (iii) be required to take title to and possession of waste
generated in that state. 150 There was no dispute that regulation of low-level
radioactive waste disposal is within the commerce power, because of the
interstate market for such disposal. 151 But New York v. United States held that
Congress could not exercise that power in a way that required state legislatures
to play a prescribed role. 152
The Court reached this result by way of a new understanding of the Tenth
Amendment. 153 Under the Tenth Amendment, the
[*20] powers that are not delegated to the federal government are "reserved to

the States." 154 One can infer from this that not all governmental powers are
granted to the federal government, for that would leave nothing for the states.
155 Thus, congressional action must have a basis in one of its enumerated
powers, not just the general power of a sovereign government. 156 New York v.
United States took the inference one step further, stating that one could
determine the extent of federal power by first determining the extent of state
power. 157 The Court characterized the Tenth Amendment as a tautology: all
powers not delegated to the federal government are reserved to the states;
therefore, a power reserved to the states was not delegated to the federal
government. 158 The Court reasoned that if a power should belong to the states,
then it must not have been delegated to the federal government. 159 As a matter
of mere logic, such reasoning is specious, 160 but it sufficed for the Court to
reconcile its analysis with previous cases characterizing the Tenth Amendment as
a mere truism. 161
Using the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on the commerce power, the Court held
that the power to regulate interstate commerce did not give Congress power to
direct state regulation. 162 The first two incentives of the statute were valid
exercises of the power because they did not mandate state action. 163 They
offered money and access to waste disposal sites to states that
[*21] chose to enact legislation, but left the states free to choose not to
act. 164 But the third incentive impermissibly forced states either to enact
legislation according to the instructions of Congress or take title to waste.
165 Congress could not so commandeer state governments into service as federal
regulators. 166 Accordingly, the provision was unconstitutional. 167
A third check on congressional action that affects states is the "clear
statement rule," as applied with particular force in Gregory v. Ashcroft. 168 A
number of cases have interpreted federal statutes not to interfere with state
interests absent a clear statement in the statute itself. 169 Thus, the Court
has read ambiguous statutes not to regulate criminal activity within the police
power of the states, 170 to pre-empt state regulation in an area of commerce,
171 or to make states liable to individuals under federal laws. 172 Gregory v.
Ashcroft formulated a particularly demand- [*22] ing form of this approach.
Missouri law required that appointed state judges retire at age seventy. 173 The
issue was whether such mandatory retirement violated the Federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the "ADEA"), 174 or fell within the
ADEA's exception for "an appointee on the policymaking level." 175 Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion held the language of the exception to be ambiguous.
176 Where congressional intent was not clearly spelled out, a federal statute
would not be read to interfere with state decisions on the qualifications of
judges. 177 Therefore, since Congress had not made it plain that state judges
were included, the Court held them to be excluded under the exception. 178 The
holding went beyond previous clear statement cases. First, previous cases had
concerned whether Congress intended a statute to apply to states at all. 179 The
ADEA, however, explicitly included states as employers. 180 Thus Gregory

extended the clear statement requirement to interpretation of not only the scope
of the statute, but also individual statutory provisions. Secondly, it found
ambiguity very readily. As the Court itself stated, it requires an "odd" reading
of the statute to exclude judges as policymaking appointed officials, especially
within the context of the definition. 181 Nevertheless, the Court held that
Congress had failed to make it clear that judges were included. 182 Gregory goes
beyond a method for determining the meaning of statutory language to an
affirmative check on congressional action. If Congress intends to take action
pursuant to the commerce power which interferes with the way a state exercises
its sovereign powers, then Congress must take pains to be very
[*23] clear about it. 183
Thus, at the time that Lopez came before the Court, congressional action under
the Commerce Clause could be subject to four related limitations:
1. In order for Congress to regulate an activity under the Commerce Clause, the
regulated activity had to affect commerce.
2. A generally applicable federal statute that impaired a state's ability to
structure integral operations in an area of traditional governmental functions
could be invalidated, if the National League of Cities rule were revived by
overruling Garcia.
3. A statute that required a state to participate in a federal regulatory scheme
could be impermissible "commandeering" under New York v. United States.
4. The Court would seek to interpret a federal statute to avoid interference
with a state's exercise of its sovereign powers.
The application of the first limitation was the issue in Lopez. But the next
Parts seek to demonstrate that all four affected the Court's analysis and are
likely to affect the ultimate effect of Lopez on the allocation of power between
the state and federal governments.

II. The Lopez Opinion: A Doctrinal Hybrid

The specific issue in Lopez was whether Congress had authority under the
Commerce Clause to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 184 which
prohibited knowing possession of a firearm on or within one thousand feet of
school grounds, subject to a number of exceptions. 185 By a vote of five to
four, the Court held that the statute unconstitutionally exceeded the commerce
power. 186 The broader significance of the opinion is that for the first time
since it abandoned the formalistic distinctions of the pre-New Deal era, the
Court held that Congress had exceeded the commerce power. The Court noted that

the case law of the modern era had consistently rejected Commerce Clause
challenges, 187 but emphasized that even while expanding congressional power,
these decisions had regularly contained dicta reaffirming
[*24] that limits to the commerce power remained. 188 The Court declared that
its decision represented the enforcement of boundaries between the powers of the
federal and state governments, in order to preserve "a distinction between what
is truly national and what is truly local." 189 Such a distinction was intended
to prevent the federal government from impermissibly regulating areas of
traditional concern to the states. This Part critically examines the analysis
the Court followed in reaching the result. The Lopez decision changes analysis
of the commerce power in several ways. Earlier decisions had framed the commerce
power analysis as a single issue, whether the regulated activity affected
interstate commerce. 190 The Lopez Court, however, split the analysis into
several steps. 191 At each step, the Court narrowed the scope of permissible
regulation. In addition to taking a narrow approach to the existing doctrine,
the Court appears to have added specific protection from federal regulation for
areas of traditional concern to the states.
The initial step was to frame the applicable test for analyzing the effect of
the activity on interstate commerce. The Court noted some equivocation in the
language of earlier decisions as to whether the activity must affect or
substantially affect interstate commerce. 192 The Court chose the more demanding
standard, holding "the proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated
activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce." 193 Even meeting that
higher standard, however, would not always be sufficient, as the Court
introduced considerations beyond the
[*25] effect on interstate commerce. 194 Although broad language in modern
cases had stated that the power to regulate interstate commerce included the
power to regulate activities that affected it, the Lopez court announced
important qualifications. 195
The Court first introduced a distinction that made its scrutiny of legislation
more demanding. It read the modern cases to extend only to "economic" or
"commercial" activity. 196 Under the modern case law, intrastate activities with
a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to come within the commerce power had
included coal mining, extortionate credit transactions, restaurants using
substantial interstate supplies, hotels, and the production and consumption of
home-grown wheat. 197 The Court generalized a rule from these holdings: "Where
economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained." 198 But the Court also relied
solely on these cases for the converse proposition: that legislation regulating
activity that was not "economic" or "commercial" may not necessarily be upheld.
In formulating this rule, the Court relied only upon cases sustaining
congressional action. It surveyed a number of cases in which the Court had
upheld an act of Congress, and found a pattern that each case involved economic
activity. That conclusion certainly is not compelled by the cases the Court

cited. Every case had upheld the statute in question, so the cases presented no
distinction between permissible and impermissible legislation. Moreover, none of
the cases had limited its holding to economic activity. The reasoning would be
more compelling if the Court had relied on a single case holding that Congress
had exceeded the commerce power and if that case had involved non-economic
activity. But all of the cases striking statutes down are now of dubious
authority, each having been explicitly rejected or eclipsed by subsequent cases.
199 So the only firm conclusion compelled by the case law was that the commerce
power is at least broad enough to sustain the regulation at issue in those
cases; by the same token, however, the fact that the limits were undefined makes
it legitimate for Lopez to draw a distinction.
[*26]
The limiting distinction chosen by the Court, that the existing Commerce Clause
cases apply only to regulation of commercial and economic activity, owes more to
the Court's objective of delimiting spheres of national and local power than to
an attempt to maintain the existing analytical framework. The basis for
upholding broad congressional regulation in each of the existing Commerce Clause
cases had been that the regulated activity could affect interstate commerce.
Interstate commerce can be affected by intrastate commercial activity and by
intrastate noncommercial activity, so if the effect on interstate commerce were
really the only issue, the distinction between intrastate commercial and
non-commercial activity would be untenable. Under the analysis of the modern
Commerce Clause cases prior to Lopez, intrastate commerce is within the commerce
power because it affects interstate commerce, not because it is commerce. But
because the cases to date have all involved activity that could be characterized
as commercial or economic, the Lopez Court was able to draw that distinction
without upsetting settled precedent. Presumably, the Court included as within
the sweep of the precedent not just commercial but more broadly economic
activity in order to accommodate the holding in Wickard v. Filburn, 200 which
upheld regulation of home-grown wheat. Wickard involved no commercial
transaction; the farmer grew the wheat for his family's consumption and for use
on the farm. 201 So either commercial or more generally economic activity will
still be broadly subject to federal regulation even under the distinction found
by Lopez.
The distinction may not prove to be a clear one. The Court made no attempt to
define what it meant by "economic" and "commercial," as though the terms needed
no further definition. Rather, in a subtle shift, the Court concluded without
discussion that gun possession is not an economic activity, as it understood the
term, or indeed as anyone could understand the term: "Section 922(q) is a
criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort
of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms." 202 But
of course one
[*27] could define those terms broadly enough to include gun possession.
Indeed, the Court's opinion itself proves this, with the contradictory assertion

that under the dissent of Justice Breyer, "any activity can be looked upon as
commercial." 203 Similarly, "economic activity" is understood by some broadly
enough to include the decision whether to carry a gun. Economics is much broader
than the study of markets and commerce. A leading treatise on the economic
analysis of law defines economics as the study of "rational choice in a
world--our world--in which resources are limited in relation to human wants."
204 Much literature analyzes criminal law in economic terms, as a system of
incentives to affect behavior. 205 Likewise, education is an economic activity,
in the sense that it involves investment of time and resources in the
accumulation of knowledge and skills for future use in work and other
activities. 206 The Court evidently used the term in a narrower sense, leaving
it for future cases to distinguish between economic and non-economic activity.
Although the Court's distinction may lack analytical rigor, it has appeal on
prudential grounds. In effect, the Court has abandoned the somewhat strained
analysis of earlier cases finding links between intrastate commercial or
economic activity and interstate commerce, apparently conceding that such links
can generally be found. But the remainder of the opinion apparently shifts to
imposing additional limits on regulation of non-commercial, non-economic
activity beyond the question of effects on interstate commerce.
The Court may have framed the issue as whether firearm possession in a school
zone substantially affects interstate commerce, 207 but its actual analysis was
rooted in concerns of federalism. Its analysis of the issue departs from the
recent cases in two ways. First, the Court appeared to reduce the deference it
had previously accorded congressional action. The opinion had earlier recognized
that previous cases had applied a low-level of scrutiny, "whether a rational
basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected
interstate commerce." 208
[*28] But in discussing the possible links between gun possession and
commerce, the Court did not term the issue as whether Congress had a rational
basis for finding a sufficient link, but rather as whether possession of a
firearm in a school zone in fact substantially affects interstate commerce. 209
Although not explicitly rejecting the "rational basis" precedents, the Court
appears to have abandoned its previous deference to Congress in favor of its own
independent assessment of the effect on commerce.
Second, in making its assessment, the Court departed from the approach of recent
cases in another way that makes it more difficult for a statute to pass muster.
In its analysis of whether the regulated activity had a substantial effect on
commerce, the opinion did not focus upon whether gun possession in a school zone
could affect interstate commerce. The Court recognized several strong arguments
that such an effect could exist: guns in school zones could increase violent
crime, which in turn could increase the costs of insurance, which are spread
through the country; people might avoid travel to areas they regard as unsafe;
guns in schools could adversely affect education, resulting in a less productive
work force. 210 The Lopez Court, however, never directly addressed the arguments

that gun possession in school zones could substantially affect interstate
commerce. 211 Rather, it considered instead the implications of accepting those
argu- [*29] ments. 212 The Court reasoned that holding the Gun-Free School
Zones Act constitutional would leave no area to exclusive state regulation. 213
Accepting the "costs of crime" argument, in the Court's view, would mean that
Congress could regulate all violent crime and even any activity that could lead
to violent crime. 214 The Court foresaw an even greater slippery slope with the
education argument. If Congress could regulate education because it affected
national productivity, it could regulate marriage, divorce, and child custody
under the Commerce Clause. 215 Likewise, if Congress could regulate gun
possession because it adversely affects education, then it could regulate the
educational process directly. 216 Accordingly, Congress could require that all
schools follow a federally mandated curriculum. 217 In short, the Court did not
conclude that gun possession could not have a substantial effect on commerce,
although it had phrased the issue in those terms. Rather, it concluded that it
would be bad policy to reach such a conclusion, because it would open the door
to complete federal regulation of two areas traditionally regulated by the
states--crime and education.
Thus, in deciding whether the activity has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, the Court considered whether that activity was one traditionally
regulated by the states. 218 The two issues would appear to be separate. An
activity that states commonly regulate may very well have an effect on
interstate commerce. Indeed, states have traditionally regulated areas at the
heart of interstate commerce. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code has been
enacted in every state and specifically contemplates application to interstate
commercial transactions. 219 More broadly, traditional areas of state common law
such as
[*30] contracts and torts frequently cover interstate interactions and
inevitably have a considerable effect on interstate commerce. Indeed, states
have regulated commercial activity so much that most Commerce Clause cases
concern the validity not of federal legislation but rather of state regulation
of commerce. 220 Whether an activity is one traditionally regulated by the
states does not determine whether that activity has an effect on interstate
commerce. However, the Court left no doubt that the question of traditionally
state-regulated activity was now part of determining the extent of the federal
commerce power. Accordingly, the principal doctrinal effect of Lopez will likely
be that state sovereignty concerns move from a background policy concern in
Commerce Clause analysis to an explicit part of the test.
In combining the two questions (whether an activity has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce and whether the activity is one of traditional state
concern), the Court implicitly extended the approach of New York v. United
States. That case held that in determining the extent of the federal commerce
power, a court must consider the extent of the powers reserved to the states.
221 Lopez extends that approach from questions of direct regulation of state

government to questions of regulation of any area of traditional state concern.
In so doing, Lopez may make the state sovereignty test more difficult to apply.
New York v. United States, by its terms, is limited to federal statutory
provisions which mandate that state governments regulate in a certain manner.
Such statutory provisions should be easily identified and, if history is any
guide, rather infrequent. 222 Under Lopez, however, state sovereignty could be
part of the Commerce Clause analysis for any statute that touched on an area of
traditional state concern--an extremely broad and vague domain. States have
traditionally concerned themselves with any number of activities. Courts may
find it as difficult to determine whether an activity is within an area of
traditional state concern as it was to determine whether a state function
qualified as traditional or integral, the National League of Cities categories
that Garcia rejected as unworkable. 223 Lopez also sets a very low threshold
[*31] for finding interference with an area of traditional state concern. The
Gun-Free School Zones Act did not regulate education, but rather regulated an
activity that could affect education. 224 Under that broad an approach, most
federal statutes will affect some area of state concern.
As a matter of constitutional doctrine, Lopez marks a notable change. Before
Lopez, a broad reading of the case law would suggest that the Commerce Clause
authorized Congress to regulate any activity that Congress had a rational basis
for concluding affected commerce. 225 The Lopez opinion is far from clear about
how it would apply in future cases, but a pragmatic assessment suggests that the
analysis will proceed along the following lines: the Court will sustain
regulation of an intrastate activity only if the Court (not Congress)
determines:
(i) the activity is a commercial transaction or economic activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce; or
(ii) the regulation is a necessary part of a broader regulation of commercial or
economic activity; 226 or
(iii) the activity is non-commercial and non-economic, has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce and is not an area of traditional concern to the states.
Thus, scrutiny of federal legislation may be more demanding. However, this does
not necessarily imply a limitation on the extent of Congress' power, if avenues
are available to satisfy such review while enacting equally extensive
regulation. If the interpretation above reflects how the Lopez Court has framed
the analysis, special protection for areas of traditional state concern exists
only for activity that is neither commercial nor economic
[*32] and is not regulated as part of a broader permissible regulation. The
next Part turns to whether this new doctrinal restriction will result in a
political limitation, and if so, the nature of that limitation.

III. Lopez as Federalism

This Part turns to the place of Lopez in the federalism debate, especially its
relationship to the Court's Tenth Amendment cases. In recent years, the members
of the Court have differed sharply on whether implementing federalism should be
left to political processes or be enforced by judicial review protecting
substantive limits on federal legislation. 227 The rhetoric of the Lopez opinion
characterizes the opinion as creating a substantive limit on federal regulation
of areas of traditional concern to the states, such as crime and education. But
rather than creating a line over which Congress cannot reach, it may prove
merely to create a jurisdictional requirement that Congress could meet with the
necessary political will. Lopez may bar blanket federal regulation of
noncommercial activity, but it leaves Congress with the power to reach such
activity through a number of possible links to commerce. But even if the case
does not create effective substantive protection of such areas, it may prove to
contribute to the procedural protections of federalism. In order for Congress to
regulate non-commercial activities, the legislation will require detailed
jurisdictional provisions. Thus, Congress must affirmatively address concerns of
federalism during the legislative process. Ironically, then, a case that draws
so much from National League of Cities (which attempted to create spheres of
activity in which states were free from federal regulation) may prove more
consistent with the approach of Garcia (which relied on political processes to
balance state and federal interests).
In considering the likely effect of Lopez, a threshold question is whether the
case represents the repudiation of the expansive reading of the Commerce Clause
in the modern era. Justice Thomas' concurring opinion forthrightly invites such
a retrenchment. Justice Thomas would construe "commerce" to cover not commercial
activities generally but only transactions in goods and transportation for such
purposes. 228 In addition, Congress
[*33] could regulate only interstate commerce, not other activities simply
because they affect interstate commerce. 229 Thus, the commerce power would no
longer authorize regulation of manufacturing or production, let alone
non-commercial activities that affected the markets for goods and services. 230
This indeed would represent a substantive limit on the power of Congress. But
none of the other opinions in Lopez appear even to consider such radical surgery
on the powers of the federal government.
The approach of the majority opinion, rather, is to trim existing Commerce
Clause doctrine around the edges. As discussed above, the case makes judicial
review under the Commerce Clause more demanding in several ways. It requires not
just an effect but a substantial effect on commerce; the Court evaluated the
effect independently rather than simply determining if there was a rational
basis for Congress to find such an effect; the existing cases were read to apply

only to commercial or economic activity; and even a substantial effect on
commerce would not sustain regulation of non-commercial, non-economic activity
in an area of traditional concern to the states. 231 But Lopez did not suggest
that any of the recent opinions were wrongly decided. Rather, the Court went to
considerable lengths to reconcile its analysis with both the results and the
reasoning of the earlier cases. The Court characterized its decision not as a
limit on those decisions, but a refusal to proceed any further. 232 While
recognizing that some of the recent decisions contained language broad enough to
support further expansion, the Court carefully showed that those decisions
consistently acknowledged limits on the commerce power, cataloging language from
the cases recognizing that the commerce power must have meaningful boundaries.
233 The majority opinion also devotes considerable effort to fitting the cases
within its formulation of the analysis. The majority's detailed discussion of
Wickard argues that the Lopez analysis is consistent with the most far-reaching
of the earlier cases. 234 The concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justice O'Connor, is even more careful to cast the holding as
[*34] consistent with existing case law. 235 Add to that the fact that four of
the Justices dissented in favor of more deference to Congress, and it becomes
clear that, to the present members of the Court, the modern cases continue as
binding authority. The question then becomes whether the Lopez analysis will
prevent Congress from regulating particular areas of activity.
Even though Lopez has announced a narrower doctrinal approach to the commerce
power, that likely will not translate into creation of areas of activity immune
to regulation by Congress. As discussed above, Lopez cast its holding as
necessary to protect local power in areas of traditional concern to the states.
In the Court's view, upholding the Gun-Free School Zones Act would have eroded
the police power of the states and the states' control of education. 236 If
Congress could outlaw gun possession, then it could regulate any violent crime.
237 If Congress could prohibit gun possession in school zones, it could regulate
every aspect of education, to the extent of ordering a particular federal
curriculum to be taught in the states' schools. 238 These are both slippery
slope arguments, but of different types. The first goes to how far Congress may
displace state regulation of the activities of citizens. The second goes to how
far Congress may control how the state conducts its own activities. The Lopez
holding presents a rather porous limit as to the first and an unnecessary one as
to the second.
Lopez will likely prove not to be a complete substantive protection of any
police power of the states. Even though it formulates a narrow version of the
"effect on commerce" approach, the doctrine does not protect areas of activity
from federal regulation. The fact that the activity is an area of traditional
state concern is not a limit if the activity is economic or commercial, or is
regulated as part of a larger regulation of commercial or economic activity. To
use the activity at issue in Lopez as an example, the opinion still leaves ample
means for Congress to regulate gun possession near schools. A federal statute

could prohibit gun posses- [*35] sion in school zones with a jurisdictional
element requiring a link to interstate commerce. 239 One could use the Court's
recent cases to draft a clause with broad coverage. The statute might prohibit
possession of a firearm in a school zone, where: (i) the firearm was or had been
in interstate commerce or affected interstate commerce; 240 or (ii) the
defendant had moved in interstate commerce; 241 or (iii) possession of the
firearm affected a person moving in interstate commerce or engaging in a
commercial transaction; 242 or (iv) the school acquired a substantial amount of
books or supplies in interstate commerce. 243 In most cases, one of the
alternatives would be met. Perhaps in a given case a court might hold one of the
foregoing provisions to be overbroad, but in general Congress clearly retains a
great deal of power to regulate gun possession in school zones. Thus, Lopez may
prevent Congress from general regulation of crime, but it does not reserve
meaningful areas of regulation to the states. Rather, it reserves to the states
only sporadic instances of crime. To measure this as a protection of the police
power of the states, one could imagine a statute that, unlike the actual statute
in Lopez, preempted state regulation. The only police power reserved to the
states in absolute terms is the ability to regulate those instances where, by a
combination of circumstances, none of the jurisdictional alternative were met.
Thus, Lopez reserves exclusive police power to the states only over random,
isolated instances of crime. The power to regulate such activities hardly
amounts to the right to govern areas of traditional concern to the states.
An alternative approach to drafting the statute could cover even more cases.
Rather than regulating gun possession as such, Congress could regulate
commercial transactions involving guns; Lopez appears to leave regulation of
commercial transactions generally within the commerce power. 244 Accordingly,
Congress
[*36] could prohibit the sale or lease of a firearm to a minor or within a
school zone. As a means of making that prohibition effective, Congress could
also prohibit possession of firearms in a school zone. Such a regulation would
be well within the rationale of Wickard, which upheld congressional regulation
of a farmer growing and consuming wheat at home, because such activity affected
the market price of wheat. 245 Moreover, there would be no need to show a nexus
to interstate commerce in individual cases, just as Perez upheld application of
a general loan-sharking statute to a wholly intrastate transaction. 246 Thus,
with respect to police powers, Lopez does not really create "a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local." 247 The reason is that
Lopez draws a distinction between commercial and non-commercial activity, but
there is little correlation between whether an activity is commercial in nature
and whether it falls within an area of traditional state concern. So the
effective limits imposed by Lopez do not mark off areas of traditional concern
to the states but rather cut broad swathes through such areas.
With respect to regulation of education, the analysis is different. Lopez
reasoned that if Congress could regulate gun possession because it adversely

affected education, then "a fortiori, it can also regulate the educational
process directly." 248 Accordingly, Congress could regulate every aspect of
state schools, including prescribing the curriculum. 249 But the label "a
fortiori" is inappropriate, because prescriptive regulation is not contained
within prohibitive regulation. The distinction is important, because such
prescriptive regulation invokes other considerations. In the unlikely event that
Congress were to dictate how state schools were to be run, the rule of New York
v. United States would be applicable. 250 The issue would be whether Congress
had required the states to play prescribed roles in a federal program, or had
offered states the opportunity to participate but the freedom to decline. An
attempt by Congress to dictate every aspect of how state schooling must be
conducted would not survive such scrutiny. Such analysis provides a much more
effective
[*37] protection than Lopez. Under Lopez, Congress could still use either
jurisdictional links to commerce or regulation of commercial transactions to
regulate many aspects of education. For example, the Lopez view of the Commerce
Clause would not prevent Congress from prohibiting the interstate shipment of
school books not included in the federal curriculum (although, of course, the
First Amendment would).
Lopez certainly affirms that the commerce power has limits, 251 but as a matter
of federalism it does not create special protection for areas of traditional
concern to the states, in the manner that National League of Cities sought to do
for "integral functions" of state governments. 252 Rather, even after the
tightening of Lopez, such areas as crime and education will retain far too many
links to interstate commerce to be immune from federal legislation. 253 If
substantive protections are to be effective, they are more likely to come in the
form of affirmative limits on particular types of federal legislation, as found
in New York v. United States. 254
Thus Lopez, although it relies heavily on principles of state sovereignty, seems
to offer little practical support for the idea that federalism requires the
creation of separate spheres of responsibility for state and federal
governments. In particular, it undercuts a view of federalism enunciated in
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion. Justice Kennedy, elaborating on views
expressed by Justice O'Connor in earlier cases, characterized federalism as
increasing governmental accountability by allocating governmental functions
between the federal and state governments. 255 Because the Constitution divides
governmental authority, citizens know whether to hold the federal or state
government accountable for failing to fulfill a particular function. 256 But
Lopez does not completely insulate particular areas of activ- [*38] ity from
federal regulation but rather leaves considerable room for overlap. Thus it will
not necessarily be clear to a citizen aggrieved about a particular social
problem in which the government has failed to fulfill its regulatory
responsibility.

But Lopez does support another conception of federalism. Lopez is likely to play
an important role in providing procedural protection against changes in the
allocation of governmental responsibilities. Although Congress will not be
barred from regulating non-commercial activity of concern to the states, Lopez
will require Congress to address directly issues of federalism in the
legislative process. In order to regulate non-commercial activity, the statute
will need to include explicit jurisdictional links to interstate commerce or
regulate the non-commercial activity as part of a broader scheme regulating
commerce. Congress must thus directly consider the effects of the proposed
regulation on non-commercial activity and affirmatively state exactly how far it
intends to use its powers. In this sense, the principal effect of Lopez is that
of a clear statement rule. In interpreting ambiguous federal statutes, the Court
avoids interpretations that change federal-state relations unless the statute is
unmistakably clear. Under the strong formulation of the clear statement rule in
Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court will require such federalism issues to be
addressed in every relevant part of the statute. Thus, Congress can only alter
the federal balance by addressing the effect on states clearly and in detail.
Lopez, although not a statutory interpretation case, will have a similar effect.
Although Lopez does not insulate broad areas of non-commercial, non-economic
activity from federal regulation, it will uphold such regulation only if clear
and explicit jurisdictional provisions address the federalism issues. Thus, the
issue of a statute's effect on areas of traditional concern to the states must
necessarily be directly and specifically addressed if legislation altering the
existing balance is considered, an approach consistent with Garcia's reliance on
the political structure of the Constitution to protect the interests of the
states. 257

IV. Conclusion

Lopez changes the basic structure of Commerce Clause analysis. The modern cases
had left an open-ended rule that Congress could regulate activity that affected
interstate commerce. The Lopez Court did not attempt the impossible task of
defining just
[*39] how substantial such effects must be to sustain regulation. Although the
opinion in form followed the "substantial effect on interstate commerce"
approach, it shifted the analysis from the effect on interstate commerce to
whether the regulated activity itself is commercial. In effect, Lopez concedes
that Congress may regulate commercial and economic activity (whether intrastate
or interstate), but attempts to preserve to the states regulation of
non-commercial and non-economic activity in areas of traditional concern to the
states (even where such activity affects interstate commerce). The Court drew
these limits by implicitly adopting the approach of its Tenth Amendment cases,
looking to state sovereignty for affirmative limits on the federal power. But
the new approach will probably not succeed in delimiting "truly local" areas,

because Congress will still be able to regulate such areas through fashioning
legislation based on links to commercial or economic activity.
However, although Lopez will thus not support the "substantive areas" conception
of federalism that informs its analysis, it will contribute to the procedural
conception. Congress will need to address issues of federalism clearly and
specifically if a statute alters the federal-state balance in non-commercial
domains. Seen in this light, the vagueness of the distinctions that Lopez relies
upon are also less troubling. "Economic," "commercial," and "area of traditional
concern to the states" are indeterminate, broad categories. 258 If Congress
drafts statutes to meet the commerce power requirements, however, courts will
rarely need to apply those categories in order to decide the constitutionality
of the statute. 259 At a time when the extent of the regulatory power of the
federal government has become a matter of intense debate, Lopez may ultimately
amount to a rule encouraging a measure of deliberation in the political process
without hobbling Congress.
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the protection of public safety, health, and morals or the promotion of the
public convenience and general prosperity. The police power is subject to
limitations of the federal and state constitutions, and especially to the
requirement of due process.

Black's Law Dictionary 1156 (6th ed. 1990).
n16 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.
n17 Id. at 1634 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30
(1937)).
n18 U.S. Const., art. I, section 8, cl. 3.
n19 See supra note 13 for the text of Tenth Amendment.
n20 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
n21 U.S. Const. art. I section 8, cl. 3.
n22 The concurring opinion of Justice Thomas in Lopez advocates a narrow
construction of the Commerce Clause. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1642 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). See infra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
n23 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
n24 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196.
n25 Id.
n26 Id. at 189-90.
n27 Id. at 194.

n28 Id.
n29 One such case is United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869), in
which the Court struck down a federal statute regulating the sale of unsafe lamp
oil, on the basis that the commerce power did not create a general federal
police power. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 43-44.
n30 See Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
n31 See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903); see also Clark Distilling Co. v.
Western Maryland Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917) (upholding regulation of interstate
transportation of liquor).
n32 See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
n33 See Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
n34 234 U.S. 342 (1914); see also Southern R.R. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20
(1911) (sustaining federal regulation of intrastate railroad equipment).
n35 The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 351.
n36 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
n37 Swift, 196 U.S. at 397-98.
n38 Id. at 398. In Justice Holmes' words, "commerce among the States is not a
technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of
business." Id. Subsequent cases relied on Swift for the proposition that the
commerce power authorized regulation protecting the "stream of commerce" from
obstructions or burdens. See Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S.
420, 439 (1930); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 518-19 (1922) (sustaining
regulation of stockyards).
n39 156 U.S. 1 (1895); see also Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898)
(holding that transactions at stockyards were local and therefore not interstate
commerce within the scope of the Sherman Act).
n40 E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 12. In the Court's well-known formulation,
"Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it." Id. In drawing
these distinctions, the Court frequently relied on its earlier decisions, under
what is commonly referred to as the "dormant" Commerce Clause, addressing
whether state statutes impermissibly attempted to regulate commerce. See, e.g.,
Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888).

n41 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
n42 Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 303-04; see also United Mine Workers v. Coronado
Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922) (holding that a strike at a coal mine was not
restraint of interstate commerce subject to the Sherman Act).
n43 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
n44 Schechter, 295 U.S. at 548-49.
n45 Id. at 546-47.
n46 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
n47 Alton, 295 U.S. at 362.
n48 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
n49 Adair, 208 U.S. at 179.
n50 See The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
n51 259 U.S. 200 (1922)
n52 Federal Baseball Club, 259 U.S. at 208-09.
n53 Id. at 209.
n54 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
n55 Hammer, 247 U.S. at 268.
n56 Id. at 273-74.
n57 Id. at 271-72.
n58 Id. at 276.
n59 For a broader political theory explaining the Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, see Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 12 (arguing that because the
Supreme Court is politically vulnerable to Congress and the President, it has
only limited congressional authority in exceptional and temporary periods when
members of the Court had distinct ideological differences with other branches).
See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993
Term: Foreword: Law As Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26 (1994) (discussing more

generally such strategic behavior by the Court).
n60 The received view is that the Court's dramatic shift in approach was a
straightforward concession to the national mood, but the view has been
challenged. See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 Va. L. Rev. 201
(1994) (arguing that the shift in decisions reflected early New Deal statutes'
poor drafting and lack of attention to constitutional requirements); Richard D.
Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and
Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1891 (1994) (arguing that the
Court's shift in stance was more gradual than commonly described); Michael
Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 620 (1994)
(describing how Justice Felix Frankfurter may have rendered the history of the
New Deal Court unclear in his efforts to present the Court favorably).
n61 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Although Jones & Laughlin is conventionally considered
the first case of the era of expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence, a close
reading of the cases may show it more consistent with the earlier cases than
commonly thought. See Barry Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The
Current of Commerce Doctrine From Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 Fordham L. Rev.
105 (1992) (arguing that Jones & Laughlin was still consistent with a
restrictive view of earlier cases and that only after the composition of the
Court changed did the Court adopt a much more expansive approach in subsequent
cases).
n62 Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 22.
n63 Id. at 22-24, 30.
n64 Id. at 36-37.
n65 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
n66 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
n67 See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).
n68 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
n69 Darby, 312 U.S. at 115.
n70 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
n71 Darby, 312 U.S. at 115-16.
n72 Id. at 122-23.

n73 Id.
n74 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, sections 201-207, 78 Stat.
241, 243-46 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. sections 2000a to 2000a-6 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)).
n75 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
n76 Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 252-53.
n77 Id. at 256.
n78 Id. at 258.
n79 Id.
n80 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
n81 Id. at 298, 302-04.
n82 Id. at 296-97.
n83 See United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 121 (1942).
n84 Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 121.
n85 315 U.S. 110 (1942).
n86 Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 121.
n87 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
n88 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29.
n89 Id. at 127.
n90 Id. at 120, 124-25.
n91 Id. at 127.
n92 Id. at 128.
n93 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29.
n94 Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04.

n95 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
n96 Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 190-91.
n97 Id. at 192.
n98 Id.
n99 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
n100 Perez, 402 U.S. at 147-48.
n101 Id. at 153-56.
n102 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
n103 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 277-82.
n104 Id. at 281-82.
n105 See James M. Maloney, Shooting for an Omnipotent Congress: The
Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Intrastate Firearms Possession, 62
Fordham L. Rev. 1795, 1796 (1994) (citing commentators questioning whether there
were any real limits left to the commerce power).
n106 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
n107 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
n108 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
n109 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 188.
n110 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
n111 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 467.
n112 Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 198-99. The case also held that such regulation was
within the scope of the commerce power. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying
text.
n113 Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 198-99.

n114 Id. at 196-97.
n115 Id. at 195-96; see also Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The
Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1073
(1980) (criticizing the distinction).
n116 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
n117 Fry, 421 U.S. at 548.
n118 Id.
n119 Id. at 547 n.7. Under the Tenth Amendment, "Congress may not exercise power
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function
effectively in a federal system." Id.
n120 Id.
n121 Id. at 557-59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
n122 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
n123 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855. The Court did not overrule but
rather distinguished Fry, stating that the temporary wage freeze in Fry did not
displace state choices about how to structure operations but only temporarily
maintained choices already made. Id. at 853.
n124 Id. at 844 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76
(1869)).
n125 Id. at 841.
n126 Id. at 841, 852. The Court's understanding of state sovereignty was
somewhat vague. See Frank I. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles:
Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 Yale
L.J. 1165 (1977) (arguing that National League of Cities relies on an inherently
contradictory vision of state sovereignty).
n127 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
n128 Id. at 845-46, 851-52 (citations omitted). The case law support for the
decision was sparse. The primary authority relied upon by the Court was Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), which held that the federal government could not
require Oklahoma to move the location of its state capital as a condition for

becoming a state. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845 (citing Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911)). The Coyle holding lends support to the
general proposition that states have protected aspects of sovereignty, but
hardly compels as broad a protection as National League of Cities announced. Cf.
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (upholding the application of
statutes setting railroad safety, labor relations, and employer liability
requirements for railroad companies owned by state governments).
n129 See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742
(1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981); Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); Tribe,
supra note 3, section 5-22 (describing how subsequent decisions narrowed the
application of National League of Cities before it was finally overruled by
Garcia).
n130 469 U.S. 528 (1985). For an approving analysis of Garcia, see Martha A.
Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a
Misguided Doctrine, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 110-18 (1985) and Mark Tushnet, Why the
Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1623 (1994).
n131 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.
n132 Id. at 546-47.
n133 Id. at 538-39.
n134 Id. at 545-46. One may question how much local governments will test social
policy by experimenting. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection:
Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 593 (1980) (arguing that
economic incentives weigh against local politicians experimenting with social
policies); Fernando R. LaGuarda, Federalism Myth: States as Laboratories of
Health Care Reform., 82 Geo. L.J. 159 (1993).
n135 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
n136 Id. at 550-53.
n137 Id. at 547-50.
n138 Id. at 550-53. "State sovereign interests, then, are more properly
protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal
system than by judicially created limitations on federal power." Id. at 552. The
classic statement of this view is Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954). See also Jesse H. Choper, The
Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial

Review, 86 Yale L.J. 1552 (1977).
n139 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-53 (quoting The Federalist No. 46, at 332, and No.
62, at 408 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed., 1961)).
n140 Id. at 556.
n141 See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988) (discussing Garcia).
n142 Thus, it appeared at the time that National League of Cities may only have
been a temporary break in the usual reluctance of the courts to limit the
federal legislative power. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of
Federalism, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1709 (1985) (criticizing Garcia as failing to
fulfill responsibilities of judicial review of legislative action); Andrzej
Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After
Garcia, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 341.
n143 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 581, 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Another possible
limit on the commerce power that was rejected by a narrow majority of the Court
but may gain a majority under the present composition of the Court was the
subject of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), which held that
federal legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause may abrogate a state's
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 22. See Eskridge &
Ferejohn, supra note 12, at 1394 (discussing how changing membership of the
Court could affect continuing authority of Union Gas).
n144 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (majority opinion
by Justice O'Connor noting that the case did not present an occasion to apply or
revisit the holding of Garcia); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 531 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (reaffirming statement from Justice O'Connor's
dissent in Garcia that the Court should enforce federalism through judicial review).
n145 Both National League of Cities and New York v. United States are fairly
regarded as Tenth Amendment cases, although neither purported to rest their
holdings on the actual words of the Tenth Amendment.
n146 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 176. For commentary on the decision,
see William A. Hazeltine, New York v. United States: A New Restriction on
Congressional Power vis-a-vis the States?, 55 Ohio St. L.J. 237 (1994) and Wayne
O. Hanewicz, New York v. United States: The Court Sounds a Return to the Battle
Scene, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 1605 (1993).
n147 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99240,
99 Stat. 1842 (codified at 42 U.S.C. section 2021 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
n148 42 U.S.C. section 2021(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

n149 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 151-52.
n150 Id. at 152-53.
n151 Id. at 159-60.
n152 Id. at 166 (holding that the Commerce Clause "authorizes Congress to
regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to
regulate state governments' regulation of interstate commerce."). The Court
rested on the basic idea that the Constitution "looks to an indestructible
Union, composed of indestructible States." Id. at 162 (quoting Texas v. White,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868), overruled by Morgan v. United States, 113
U.S. 476 (1885)). Notably, it did not rest on another possible constitutional
basis, the Guarantee Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, section 4, under which states
are guaranteed a republican form of government. See Deborah J. Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 Colum.
L. Rev. 1 (1988) (arguing that the Guarantee Clause protects state government
autonomy from required participation in federal regulation). Rather, the Court
relied primarily on two earlier cases that had sustained congressional action
while noting that Congress had not required the states to adopt specific
regulations. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 161-62 (discussing Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) and FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982)). Neither case held that such a requirement
would necessarily be invalid, so New York v. United States was breaking new
ground. The sparse case law support may receive little assistance from the
historical record. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79
Va. L. Rev. 1957 (1993) (arguing on the basis of historical sources that New
York v. United States is not consistent with the historical intent of the
Framers of the Constitution); Martin H. Redish, Doing It with Mirrors: New York
v. United States and Constitutional Limitations on Federal Power to Require
State Legislation, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 593 (1994) (arguing that New York v.
United States was wrongly decided and that the Court's precedents do not impose
a state sovereignty limitation on the federal commerce power); see also Evan H.
Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State
Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1001 (1995) (criticizing
New York v. United States as taking a simplistic approach to the complex issue
of state autonomy).
n153 For an argument that the result in New York v. United States may have been
correct but that the opinion's use of authority is misleading, see Richard E.
Levy, New York v. United States: An Essay on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent,
History, and Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal Power, 41 Kan. L. Rev.
493 (1993). On the same theme, see James W. Ducayet, Publius and Federalism: On
the Use and Abuse of The Federalist in Constitutional Interpretation, 68 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 821 (1993). The decision has also been characterized as justifiable on

prudential grounds but doctrinally questionable. See H. Jefferson Powell, The
Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 Va. L. Rev. 633 (1993).
n154 U.S. Const. amend X.
n155 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156 (citing 3 Joseph Story,
Commentaries On The Constitution Of The United States 752 (1833)).
n156 Id.
n157 Id. at 157.
n158 Id.
n159 Id.
n160 An analogy to a residuary clause in a will might illustrate how strained
such reasoning is. A public-spirited decedent might have left her estate to the
federal and state governments. "I leave my personal effects to the federal
government; everything else I leave to the state." In order to determine what
the state gets, it would seem necessary to first decide what constituted her
personal effects. For example, to decide who would get her books, one would
first decide whether the phrase "personal effects" covered books. Reading the
clause the way that New York v. United States reads the Tenth Amendment, one
could first decide whether the books should go to the state; if so, then they
were not personal effects that went to the federal government.
n161 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156 (quoting United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (characterizing the Tenth Amendment as a truism that
contains no substantive limits)). As recently as 1988, the Court had stated that
the Tenth Amendment provided no substantive limits on federal powers. See South
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1988).
n162 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 166.
n163 Id. at 173-74.
n164 Id.
n165 Id. at 174-77. New York v. United States could have served as a vehicle for
reconsidering Garcia. A statute that commandeers state legislatures would seem
to threaten states' ability to structure integral operations and the states'
independent sovereignty. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 841, 845-46,
852. But Justice O'Connor's opinion distinguished that line of cases as
applicable only to general statutes regulating both states and private parties.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 160. The opinion made no effort to

explain why concerns of state sovereignty were any different in the present
case, or indeed whether scrutiny of federal action would be any different at
all. Justice O'Connor also carefully did not acknowledge Garcia as sound
authority, stating simply that "this case presents no occasion to apply or
revisit the holdings of any of these cases." Id. So for the present, the
possible return of National League of Cities is left for a future Court.
n166 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 176. This view was anticipated in
Joseph Lipner, Imposing Federal Business on Officers of the States: What the
Tenth Amendment Might Mean, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 907 (1989) (arguing that the
Tenth Amendment shields inner workings of state governments from federal
regulation).
n167 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 177. The Court stated that,
consistent with its view of the Tenth Amendment as a tautology, one could view
the provision as unconstitutional because it exceeded the enumerated powers of
Congress or because it infringed "upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by
the Tenth Amendment." Id.
n168 501 U.S. 452 (1991); see also William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45
Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992) (questioning whether clear statement rules are
beneficial because they protect constitutional structures by giving weight to
underenforced constitutional norms, or harmful because they reflect undemocratic
judicial restrictions on legislative action); Note, Clear Statement Rules,
Federalism, and Congressional Regulation of States, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1959
(1994) (arguing that clear statement rules borrow from both the procedural and
substantive conceptions of federalism); Deanna L. Ruddock, Note, Gregory v.
Ashcroft: The Plain Statement Rule and Judicial Supervision of Federal-State
Relations, 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1563 (1992).
n169 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 2608, 2617 (1992).
n170 See Tribe, supra note 3, section 5-6 at 316.
n171 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
n172 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (applying clear
statement rule in interpreting federal statute to determine whether Congress has
abrogated a state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity); Will v. Michigan
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (holding that states are not
"persons" liable for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. section 1983
because Congress did not make it clear that it intended states to be covered);
see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (applying
presumption against interpreting federal statute granting money to states to be
conditioned on state compliance with federal regulation).

n173 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 455.
n174 Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
sections 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
n175 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 456 (quoting 29 U.S.C. section 630(f)).
n176 Id. at 467.
n177 Id.
n178 Id.
n179 Id. at 476 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgement) (citing Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 437
U.S. 234 (1985) and Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)).
n180 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 456 (citing 29 U.S.C. section 630(b)(2)).
n181 Id. at 467.
n182 Id.
n183 Requiring Congress to be specific thus works against the incentives of
legislatures to be vague in enacting statutes in order to avoid making difficult
decisions about changes in the federal-state balance. See Ann Althouse,
Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42
Duke L.J. 979, 1006-07 (1993). The clear statement rule also may lead to a
clearer interpretive regime on the part of the Court.
n184 See supra note 4.
n185 Lopez, 115 U.S. at 1626.
n186 Id.
n187 Id. at 1628.
n188 Id. at 1628-29.
n189 Id. at 1634 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30
(1937)).
n190 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981) ("The task of a court that is asked to determine whether a particular

exercise of congressional power is valid under the Commerce Clause is relatively
narrow. The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated
activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a
finding." (citations omitted)); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150-52
(1971).
n191 The steps are: (i) determining whether the regulated activity affects
interstate commerce; (ii) determining whether or not the regulated activity is
commercial/economic; and (iii) determining whether the activity is one of
traditional state concern. See infra notes 192-224 and accompanying text.
n192 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. As discussed above, previous decisions had
established three categories subject to regulation under the commerce power: (i)
the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (ii) the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce and persons or things in interstate commerce; and (iii)
activities affecting commerce. Id. at 1629-30. The Lopez Court held with little
discussion that the first two categories were inapplicable to gun possession in
school zones. Id. at 1630. Accordingly, the issue was whether gun possession in
a school zone had a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to come within the
commerce power of Congress. Id.
n193 Id. at 1630.
n194 Id. at 1630-32.
n195 Id.
n196 Id. at 1630.
n197 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1971), Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942)).
n198 Id.
n199 See supra notes 59-104 and accompanying text.
n200 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
n201 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114.
n202 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31. The Court also noted that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act did not include either of two means that might keep legislation within
the scope of the Commerce Clause: a jurisdictional element requiring a nexus to

commerce or legislative findings that guns in school zones affected interstate
commerce. Id. at 1631. Congress amended the Gun-Free School Zones Act to include
findings of a link to interstate commerce while the Lopez case was pending.
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, section
320904, 108 Stat. 2125 (codified at 18 U.S.C. section 922(q) (1994)). The
Government did not rely on those findings to apply retroactively and the Court
did not consider them. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 n.4.
n203 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.
n204 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 3 (4th ed. 1992) (citing Gary
S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (1976)).
n205 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 204, at 217-49 (analyzing crime as economic
behavior and citing similar work).
n206 See Gary S. Becker, Human Capital (2d ed. 1975).
n207 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
n208 Id. at 1629. See also, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (citations omitted).
n209 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32. Rational basis review plays an important role
in balancing judicial review with legislative democracy. Robert W. Bennett,
"Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory,
67 Cal. L. Rev. 1049, 1056-60 (1979) (discussing the role of rational basis
review in various areas of constitutional law).
n210 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632-33. Justice Breyer's dissent demonstrates at
length the connection between education and the economy, citing a number of
studies on the economic effects of education. Id. at 1657-71 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
n211 To refute such arguments convincingly, one would have to show that such
effects were not sufficient under the case law. This would require
distinguishing the facts of cases that found a sufficient link to commerce.
Under the analysis of previous cases, such a showing would be difficult. In
every case since 1937, the Court has considered whether the regulated activity
affected commerce and has each time held it did, often relying on links to
commerce similar to the foregoing, or even more indirect. Thus, previous cases
found sufficient effect on interstate commerce where mining caused environmental
damage that diminished the value of land, Hodel, 452 U.S. at 277-82, where
extortion permitted criminal syndicates to raise funds and to take control of
businesses, Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), and where a farmer grew
his own wheat at home, therefore making it unnecessary to buy from others,

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Gun possession in schools can affect
education, which undoubtedly has economic effects on salaries and productivity,
and can affect the market for guns and whether they flow from state to state. To
literally apply the test--whether there was a substantial effect on interstate
commerce--would require distinguishing those cases.
n212 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632-33.
n213 Id.
n214 Id. at 1632. One judge has calculated that federal statutes define over
three thousand crimes; since that calculation, Congress has added a significant
number of offenses, including those of the 1994 Crime Bill. Sara Sun Beale, Too
Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 Hastings L.J. 979, 980 n.10 (1995); Roger J. Miner,
Crime and Punishment in the Federal Courts, 43 Syracuse L. Rev. 681 (1992).
n215 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
n216 Id. at 1633.
n217 Id.
n218 Id. at 1633-34. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, joined by Justice
O'Connor, also emphasized the view that Congress was regulating a non-commercial
activity in a way that encroached on an area of "traditional state
concern"--education. Id. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
n219 For a discussion of the role of uniform state laws in federalism, see
Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws
Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 83
(1993).
n220 See Tribe, supra note 3, sections 6-2 to 6-29 (discussing Commerce Clause
scrutiny of state legislation under "dormant" Commerce Clause analysis,
preemption, and related doctrines).
n221 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).
n222 The majority opinion in New York v. United States noted that "the take
title provision appears to be unique. No other federal statute has been cited
which offers a state government no option other than that of implementing
legislation enacted by Congress." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 177.
n223 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985).

n224 Note also that even if Congress lacked power to regulate aspects of
education under the Commerce Clause, it nevertheless could affect the way a
state conducts education through its other powers, for example by giving funds
for education to the states with conditions attached. See South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding grants to states conditioned on following
regulatory conditions); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending:
Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 Sup. Ct. Rev. 85; Ronald D. Rotunda, The
Doctrine of Conditional Preemption and Other Limitations on Tenth Amendment
Restrictions, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 289 (1984); see also David E. Engdahl, The
Spending Power, 44 Duke L. J. 1 (1994).
n225 See supra notes 59-104 and accompanying text. Lopez leaves intact the other
two categories of permissible regulation under the Commerce Clause: regulating
the use of channels of interstate commerce and protecting goods or people in
commerce and the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Both before and after
Lopez, the commerce power is also subject to specific limits in other provisions
of the Constitution, such as the Bill of Rights.
n226 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31 (holding that the prohibition of gun
possession near schools did not regulate commerce or economic enterprises and
was not "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated.").
n227 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 205-06 (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority opinion incorrectly
returned to a substantive view rather than the procedural view found in Garcia).
n228 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1643-44 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Richard A.
Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1987)
(advocating an extremely narrow understanding of the commerce power); Jacques
LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal
Commerce Power, 31 San Diego L. Rev. 555 (1994) (arguing that commerce power
should extend only to areas of commerce where externalities prevent efficient
state regulation).
n229 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1644-45 (Thomas, J., concurring).
n230 Id.
n231 See supra notes 192-224 and accompanying text.
n232 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
n233 Id. at 1628-29.

n234 Id. at 1630.
n235 Id. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joining in the majority opinion's
"necessary though limited holding"). In addition, even if Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor were inclined toward Justice Thomas' reading of the Commerce Clause as
an abstract matter, they have in other contexts expressed great reluctance to
depart from settled law in important constitutional questions. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 2791, 2814-16 (1992) (opinion by Justice O'Connor,
joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter, expressing the importance to the public
legitimacy of the Court of following stare decisis).
n236 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.
n237 Id. at 1632.
n238 Id. at 1633.
n239 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
n240 See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
n241 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); see
also Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 ("Respondent was a local student at a local
school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate
commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have
any concrete tie to interstate commerce.").
n242 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
n243 See United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995) (sustaining federal
racketeering conviction as having sufficient nexus to interstate commerce, where
defendant operated gold mine in Alaska using substantial equipment and supplies
purchased in California). See also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
To regulate the entire school zone on the basis of the school purchasing
interstate supplies might be beyond the holding of Katzenbach. This element
could be limited to possession of a firearm on the grounds of the school itself.
n244 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633. Justice Kennedy's concurrence, in which
Justice O'Connor joined, characterized "the congressional power to regulate
transactions of a commercial nature [as an] essential principle." Id. at 1637
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
n245 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942).
n246 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971).

n247 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 30 (1937)).
n248 Id. at 1633.
n249 Id.
n250 See supra notes 145-67 and accompanying text.
n251 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.
n252 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
n253 The broad array of federal crimes has sparked considerable discussion about
the appropriate functions of the local and national governments. See, e.g.,
Symposium, Federalization of Crime: The Roles of the Federal and State
Governments in the Criminal Justice System, 46 Hastings L. J. 965 (1995).
n254 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992).
n255 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1638-39 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing FTC v. Ticor
Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992), New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 155-66 (1992) and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787 (1982) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)). Such a rationale
can be seen as consistent with a procedural rationale for federalism. See D.
Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process--The
Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U.L. Rev. 577
(1985).
n256 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1638-39.
n257 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-53.
n258 The Court had little success in applying the categories of "integral" and
"traditional" state governmental functions, which are narrower if no less vague.
n259 Such issues may continue to arise in considering the application of a
statute in particular instances. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 115 S.
Ct. 1732 (1995); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).

